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One of the darker sides of the increasingly unregulated movement of persons and goods across national borders is the internationalization of crime and the networks that sponsor it. Efforts to expand
criminal investigations across national borders create an urgent need
to coordinate U.S. efforts with those of other governments. To meet
this need, cooperating countries will have to assess the legitimacy of
law enforcement methods that, while routine in the United States, are
greeted with skepticism elsewhere. Among the most controversial of
these methods is the use of covert tactics, especially undercover investigations, to infiltrate criminal networks.
Different countries vary significantly in their attitudes toward the
legitimacy of undercover investigations and in their approaches to
regulating them. Responding to the increasing need of European and
American policymakers to coordinate their efforts against crime, two
highly synthetic and wide-ranging anthologies have collected the contributions of legal scholars, sociologists, criminologists, police officials,
and policymakers in an effort to illuminate the differing national contours of the debate about undercover policing. The first of these
books, Undercover: Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective,
came out in 1995. The editors are the Dutch criminologist Cyrille Fijnaut, who has written extensively about the European experience
with undercover policing, and the American sociologist Gary Marx,
who has authored seminal work on American undercover policing, including the invaluable Undercover: Police Surveillance in America
The second work, UndercoverPolicingand Accountability from an Int Assistant Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. For their help and advice, I
would like to thank David Gerber, Friedrich Katz, and Richard Ross.
I Gary T. Marx, Undercover: Police Surveillance in America (Twentieth Century Fund
1988).
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ternationalPerspective,was published in 1997. Its editor is Monica den
Boer, a senior lecturer in Justice and Home Affairs at the European
Institute of Public Administration. This volume collects the papers
contributed to a Dutch symposium on undercover policing in 1996.
Held in the aftermath of a scandal about misuse of undercover tactics
by the Dutch police, the symposium invited international contributors
to rethink the place of such methods in a democratic society. The two
books under review illuminate differences between American and
European perspectives on undercover operations. These anthologies
also explore the shared difficulties of controlling undercover operations and the ways in which increasing international cooperation will
affect the choices facing national policymakers.
Together, these works make it possible to identify a series of
tradeoffs among competing goals, interests, and strategies in undercover operations that different countries negotiate in dissimilar ways,
but that all of them must confront. I have identified and coined labels
for eight tradeoffs. A few of these tradeoffs are mentioned in the volumes. Some are implicit. The rest are my own suggestions for organizing the material. I will use these tradeoffs as headings to discuss the issues and questions presented in the books under review and, more
generally, to reflect on the challenges of undercover investigations.
Distinguishing policy, institutional, and political tradeoffs makes
it possible to see the variety of approaches to domestic and international undercover policing as compromises struck between competing
values and techniques. These competing values and techniques include: (1) deception as against coercion; (2) crime detection as against
prevention; (3) electronic surveillance (intruding on privacy) as
against infiltration (intruding on autonomy); (4) undercover agents as
against civilian informants; (5) intelligence (and national security) as
against evidence (and criminal enforcement); (6) protecting society
from the excessive diffusion of undercover police work (by quarantining covert methods in specialized units) as against protecting society
from the specialized units (and the potentially corrupting effect of
their insulation from regular police work); (7) embracing undercover
policing as an effective technique as against preserving a sense of its
2

With its focus on domestic and international accountability mechanisms, the den Boer

volume highlights some of the policy concerns that guide constraints on undercover methods, but
without always identifying competing goals and interests, the tensions between these competing
concerns, and the possible compromises between them. Some of the contributions to the Fijnaut
and Marx volume also make passing reference to competing policy considerations, noting tensions, for example, between facilitating crime and preventing it, between coercion and stealth, or
between collecting intelligence and gathering evidence. These observations are incidental, however, to the editors' and contributors' own themes and purposes. Marx discusses paradoxes of
undercover work in his essay Undercover:Some Implicationsfor Policy (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p

319).
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ethical ambiguity; (8) accommodating the selection of law enforcement goals, the definition of offenses, and the rules of procedure and
evidence to undercover techniques, as against preserving independent
criteria for assessing whether covert tactics work.
*In Part I of this Review, I introduce the aims and themes of these
volumes on their own terms. In Part II, I present my own distillation of
the central tradeoffs as a way of bringing structure to the debate
about undercover policing and of organizing the contributions under
review. Part II will draw on the national differences discussed in both
anthologies to illustrate these tradeoffs. In Part III, I will examine the
ways in which the rise of transnational undercover investigations
complicates these tradeoffs, while introducing a new conflict between
the demands of effective cooperation, on the one hand, and of national autonomy and sovereignty, on the other.
I. THE BOOKS: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON A
"NECESSARY EvIL"

The Fijnaut/Marx anthology ranges widely from Canada and the
United States across Iceland and Western Europe to the former Soviet
Union and its successors. The contributors include American and
European legal scholars, criminologists, and sociologists. Among their
central aims is to analyze the division of national investigative powers
among competing police forces and intelligence services. In so doing,
the contributors go beyond speaking of "the state" as a unified entity
and carefully distinguish those branches of the police or intelligence
services that perform covert functions from those that do not. The
covert functions that the contributors describe include not only undercover infiltration by police agents or civilian informants but also
secret surveillance, particularly the electronic interception of conversations through telephone wiretaps and ambient microphones.'
The French, German, and Swedish contributions focus on the
autonomous domestic evolution of infiltration and surveillance. They
each recount the gradual process by which their countries legalized
covert practices, accepting some tactics as the price for prohibiting
others. By contrast to these more self-contained articles, the Dutch,
Belgian, and Icelandic accounts connect the gradual legalization of
covert policing to the influence of American techniques, particularly
those of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"). Ethan
Nadelmann describes the "'Americanization' of European drug enforcement" in his contribution, The DEA in Europe (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 269-89). In their account of undercover policing in Ice-

3

I will term both of these "electronic surveillance."
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land, an American sociologist and an Icelandic sociologist directly
question the value of importing American undercover methods into a
country with almost no drug use and almost no crime.
Articles about the Canadian and British experience with undercover investigations complement the European picture. They depict
the lesser role of such tactics in two common law legal systems that interpose fewer legal obstacles to such practices than does the rest of
Europe. Canada's and Britain's lesser reliance on undercover techniques (particularly against the powerful) contrasts even more strikingly with the widening American use of such tactics against all sectors
of society, including against the government and the police, as depicted in one of Gary Marx's contributions, When the Guards Guard
Themselves: Undercover Tactics Turned Inward (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 213).
Fijnaut and Marx's introduction to their volume makes it clear
that the prevalence of undercover methods in the United States
stands in stark contrast to the deeply ingrained distaste, even abhorrence, for such tactics in Western Europe. What worries Western
European critics is not that these methods are foreign, but rather that
they are all too familiar and rooted in only recently discredited practices. Europeans associate undercover agents with a long history of internal spying by state security services, who used "agents provocateurs" to infiltrate and radicalize dissident political movements, occasionally inciting acts of violence to discredit these movements (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 3-10, 15, 32-33, 272). The term "agent provocateur" itself comes from France, which adopted the use of undercover tactics on a significant scale in the seventeenth century and perfected these techniques during the revolutionary terror, Napoleonic
rule, and the subsequent ascendancy of centralized state power (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 2-5,29). Widely used and abused as a form of
social control throughout the nineteenth century, undercover infiltrations have become associated as much with the suppression of political deviance as with the control of crime (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 510, 15, 29, 142-43). At the end of the Second World War, Western
European democracies nominally renounced undercover activity as a
crime-fighting tool, while continuing to use such methods more freely
in the service of national security (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 15).
The Fijnaut/Marx volume is largely organized by country, placing
the plethora of approaches to undercover policing within their distinctive national contexts. The collection supplements these accounts with
useful historical perspectives on the European origins of undercover
police work and on more recent American efforts to reimport such
tactics into Europe (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 2-10,15-16, 269-89). As
Fijnaut and Marx emphasize in their introduction, much of the story
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of Western Europe's response to American undercover methods is
therefore a tale of reaction to the reimportation of a tactic that
Europe had successfully exported to the United States (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 15). However, European concerns do not center only on
the discredited history of these tactics, but also on the recognition that
the methods that the DEA and U.S. Customs Service are reintroducing to Europe have been greatly transformed since they first crossed
the Atlantic to America (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 13-15, 269-71).
These changes reflect not only innovations in the technology of surveillance, but also our unique experience with Prohibition, American
organized crime, and the drug trade (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 11, 15,
270-71,274).
Among the countries surveyed, the great division in attitudes that
emerges from this anthology is between the freer and more selfconfident use of covert methods by those countries (namely the
United States, France, and the former Soviet Union) that draw upon
their own well-rooted traditions of undercover policing, and the more
cautious approach of those countries that are reimporting a dormant
and once-discredited tactic (or which, like Britain (Fijnaut and Marx,
eds, pp 23,177-78,210-11) and Canada (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 1819), have a weaker domestic tradition of undercover policing). Louise
Shelley's Soviet Undercover Work complements the accounts of
French and American traditions with a cautionary depiction of the
abuses of such methods in a system lacking a strong commitment to
the rule of law and civil liberties (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
pp 155-74). Without countervailing protections for privacy or autonomy, and without aspiring to make the police accountable to the public, the unfettered pursuit of social control enabled the Soviet government to infiltrate all sectors of society with informants who not
only aided in the enforcement of the criminal law but also
"mold[ed] ... society to the state ideology" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p

157). The commitment to that ideology faded with the end of the Soviet era. But the use of infiltration has not abated significantly, nor has
there been much effort to make the police accountable for their tactics (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 157,170-73).
While the Fijnaut and Marx anthology includes one contribution'
about the special characteristics of transnational undercover investigations (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 291-309), the anthology focuses more
on differing national attitudes to domestic undercover policing than
on transnational undercover operations in which several countries cooperate. By contrast, the den Boer volume is thematically organized
around two central inquiries. First, how can undercover work become
international without undercutting domestic efforts at control? Second, how should undercover policing be controlled domestically?
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Like most of the contributors to the Fijnaut and Marx anthology,
the den Boer presenters treat proactive, covert policing as more invasive and dangerous than traditional, reactive police work (den Boer,
ed, pp 71-75). By contrast to such traditional methods, proactive
probes target organized criminal activity, which may be ongoing and
diverse. The goals of such infiltrations may be at once more diffuse
and more complex, and may therefore require greater direction and
control than the aims of more open and reactive detective work. Undercover agents intrude into private homes and private relationships.
They may offer inducements that entice the unwary into committing
crimes they might not otherwise have contemplated. Informants and
undercover agents alike may become complicit in the offenses they
investigate. Enmeshing themselves in the lives of their targets, offering
criminal opportunities, and themselves subjected to temptation and
the lure of easy money, undercover agents may pose a moral hazard to
those around them and to themselves.
While taking note of American influence and of the increasingly
transnational character of undercover investigations, the contributors
to these volumes are reluctant to predict a convergence of national
norms or regulatory approaches. Yet such a convergence of national
approaches is clearly a goal for many of the presenters published in
the den Boer collection, since it would improve international cooperation and accountability. This matters to the contributors, because the
theme of the den Boer volume is how to control undercover investigations, both nationally and internationally. This concern echoes Peter
Klerks's cautionary note in describing Dutch reliance on undercover
methods (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 103-40): "[I]f these most intrusive
and precarious methods are not handled in a very prudent manner,
and if the Dutch police fail to keep the spectre of corruption from the
special teams and closed departments, then scandals and a subsequent
reform process will be inevitable in the coming years" (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 136).
These worries proved prophetic. Den Boer's volume, published
only two years after the Fijnaut and Marx anthology, starts with the aftermath of such a scandal. A firestorm of protest erupted over disclosures that Dutch undercover squads allowed drugs to be imported
into the Netherlands and released onto the street as a way of testing
the accuracy of informants' information and perhaps of enhancing the
standing of informants within the drug organization or rewarding informants for their cooperation (den Boer, ed, pp 17-18, 21, 49-50).

4
The scandal, which occurred in 1993, predated the publication of Klerks's article in the
Fijnaut and Marx anthology, but its aftermath was the focus of the symposium that forms the basis of den Boer's volume.
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Undercover methods came into further disrepute when it became
public that the Dutch infiltration of narcotics networks had enmeshed
investigators in the narcotics economy. Agents had used drug proceeds
to pay large sums of money to informants and to purchase cars and
radios for the police. These operations escaped oversight by Dutch
prosecutors and went on virtually in seclusion (den Boer, ed, p 18).
Until the scandal, the Dutch government had been among the most
receptive in Europe to DEA undercover methods. Afterwards, the
Dutch came to question their willingness to adopt American undercover tactics!
The den Boer anthology is divided into two sections. The first section examines other Western European attempts to regulate undercover activity in an effort to identify viable mechanisms for making
agents accountable to the executive and legislative branches of government. Should criminal investigations be subjected to centralized
review? Should rules concerning permissible and impermissible tactics
be developed through case law, enacted through legislation, or regulated through secret executive guidelines? Should electronic surveillance be subject to different controls than undercover infiltration?
Should undercover methods require prior judicial authorization
through something akin to a warrant requirement? Or do executive
controls suffice to ensure compliance with legal requirements? The
contributors generally agree on the need for centralized accountability mechanisms but would limit statutory regulation of covert methods
to those methods, like electronic surveillance, that they view as the
greatest threats to privacy; they distinguish between methods that infringe fundamental rights under the European Convention on Human
Rights and those that do not (den Boer, ed, pp 22, 74, 85-86, 105).
They also agree that regulation is necessary to ensure accountability
for decisions about whether to allow the police to commit crimes to
maintain their cover or about whether to make deals with cooperating
criminals (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 64-65, 152-53; den Boer, ed, pp
32-35,44,89).

The second section of the den Boer anthology addresses the difficulties of regulating undercover investigations that spill across national borders. These may start out as domestic or as multinational initiatives. Either way, they require special mechanisms of accountability
and control. Domestically, reviewing courts must have access to information about undercover activities abroad. They must know how
evidence was gathered before deciding whether to allow its use at
5 The scandal prompted a parliamentary inquiry into the best means of controlling undercover investigations (den Boer, ed, p 17). The commission of inquiry responded with sweeping
proposals for change, which the den Boer contributors debated at the Dutch symposium where
these papers were first presented (den Boer, ed, pp 4-5).
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trial. At the operational level, investigators in one country may not
understand the legal requirements that govern the use of certain
methods abroad. Over and over again, the presenters advocate: (a)

greater harmonization of criminal laws and criminal procedures across
national borders; (b) international conventions on permissible under-

cover methods and uniform definitions of "organized crime"; (c) "tagging" shared computer data with indicators of their source and reli-

ability; and (d) adjudication of permissible methods according to a
uniform European law under the umbrella of the European Union
(den Boer, ed, pp 118, 121-26, 138-41, 167-68, 181-82, 196-97). Inevitably, countries must balance the need for effective cooperation
against national autonomy in the regulation of undercover methods.
This tradeoff organizes many of the contributions about international
undercover policing in both of the volumes under review and forms
the topic of Part II of this essay.
II. THE COMPROMISES UNDERLYING UNDERCOVER POLICING

Perhaps the greatest contribution of these collections is that they
suggest the legal, political, institutional, and policy tradeoffs behind
covert policing.6 Some of these tradeoffs involve choices between undercover methods and other law enforcement techniques. Others
trade some limitation on the scope or nature of undercover activity
for another interest, or one form of undercover activity for another.
A. Tradeoff: Deception versus Coercion
Conventional police methods could be characterized as "necessary evils" since they involve some use of the state's coercive power
and therefore some infringement of liberty. (Searches, seizures, arrests,
and interrogations all reduce liberty, property, or privacy in the name
of some countervailing state interest.) Undercover methods differ
from conventional techniques because they substitute one "necessary
evil" (deception) for another "necessary evil" (coercion).
Limiting the use of deception (by preventing the police from posing as drug dealers, fences, and the like) may entail greater reliance on
conventional tactics, and may therefore substitute coercion for stealth
and pretense. Conversely, limiting the coercive powers of the police
and their ability to conduct warrantless searches invites development
of "proactive" alternatives, including undercover agents, informants,
and electronic surveillance. Marx's work on undercover investigations
in the United States suggests that much of the rise of American un6 By covert policing I mean electronic and other secret surveillance, along with undercover infiltration.
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dercover policing can be traced to heightened legal constraints on the
state's use of coercive power (such as limitations on the interrogations
of suspects and protection of the right to counsel). Likewise, in his
contribution to the essay collection Abscam Ethics: Moral Issues and
Deception in Law Enforcement,8 Sanford Levinson argues that "the
real villain ... might be the Fifth Amendment and the extent of its
protection against compelled self-incrimination."9 The Fifth Amendment invites the use of undercover tactics as a means of obtaining by
deceptive stratagems prior to arrest what the police may not elicit by
coercion afterwards.
There is a tradeoff, then, between some police methods decried as
coercive and others derided as deceptive (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp
331-32). If the police may not question a suspect, they may postpone
his arrest and obtain his confession by stealth (for example, by posing
as a criminal confederate). If they may not search a residence, they
may send an informant to gain admittance under the cover of friendship. Indeed, Levinson suggests that criticism of intrusive spying and
the personal betrayals this entails is somewhat inconsistent with our
legal system's willingness to countenance other intrusions into personal relationships, such as forcing friends and relatives to testify
against each other under the subpoena power of the court. ' In breaching the intimacy of personal relationships (through the infiltration of
an undercover agent or informant), the police do no more than what
the subpoena power already allows.
B.

Tradeoff: Prevention versus Detection

The tradeoff between traditional police work and undercover tactics is also a choice between detecting crime after it has been committed and preventing crime before it occurs. Preventing crime may seem
better than detecting it. But if the government's undercover operation
tacitly encouraged the offense, the investigation may have created a
crime rather than prevented it.
Helgi Gunnlaugsson and John E Galliher's account of undercover
operations in Iceland casts doubt on the preventive value of undercover drug investigations in a country with virtually no internal net7 Gary T.Marx, Undercover:Police Surveillance in America 35,49 (California 1988).
8 Sanford Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration,in Gerald M. Caplan,
ed, Abscam Ethics: Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement 43, 59 (Police Foundation
1983) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on "direct questioning" of the defendant
if he "refuses to cooperate" forces police to seek evidence through undercover tactics and by
seeking out informants).
9 Id at 59.
10 Id at 57 (asking how one can "consistently exhibit outrage against infiltrating private
lives while at the same time supporting the compelled testimony of friends, lovers, family members, and colleagues whom they would otherwise wish to protect by remaining silent?").
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work of drug crime (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 235-47). One of the
most "successful" undercover operations that they discuss involved an
incarcerated defendant's reluctant offer to distribute cocaine in Iceland rather than sell it in Denmark, as he had originally planned. Giving voice to the authors' own skepticism about the value of this "preventive" infiltration (given that no crime would have occurred on Iceland's soil but for the informant's suggestion that the offender divert
his shipment to Iceland), the head of Iceland's drug rehabilitation unit
"dismissed the danger of this individual and the significance of the
charges.... He said: 'I don't have the slightest idea of how 1.2 kilos of
cocaine can be marketed [in Iceland]' because there [are] only 5-10
heavy users of cocaine diagnosed in the nation each year" (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 243). Likewise, Gary Marx's account of the Abscam corruption scandal in the United States (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 22425) casts doubt on whether congressmen who reluctantly yielded to an
undercover agent's corrupt entreaties would have committed any
comparable acts of corruption had the government not enticed and
pushed them in that direction. Yet even when an investigation does
not create the crimes being probed, the government must choose
whether to prevent a crime or to allow it to go forward in the interest
of strengthening a later prosecution or uncovering a criminal network
(Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 321).
Tradeoff: Privacy versus Autonomy (or Electronic Surveillance
versus Infiltration)

C.

Covert operations may require a choice between undercover infiltration and secret forms of surveillance, such as wiretaps or ambient
microphones. Unlike electronic surveillance, which does not alter the
target's environment, beliefs, and perceptions," undercover operations
may alter the target's criminal opportunities and incentive structure or
manipulate his conduct, creating a risk that the investigation may encourage his criminal actions. 2 Unlike undercover investigations, electronic surveillance avoids the risk of affecting the conduct of the target, but at the cost of intruding more deeply into his personal affairs.
The distinction between intruding on privacy and intruding on autonomy is the difference between observing the target's behavior in his
most authentic, but also most private, moments versus observing behavior that may not be a genuine expression of his intentions if the
undercover infiltration changes his plans. Accordingly, a legal system
11 This assumes

that the target is not aware of the surveillance.
The risk of altering behavior in the process of investigating it, a danger latent to some
extent in all undercover infiltrations, becomes manifest when the target commits a crime because
of the opportunities introduced by the undercover agent.
12
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that permits covert tactics may use undercover infiltration as a substitute for electronic surveillance, 3 or may make greater use of electronic
surveillance than undercover infiltration (which is riskier and harder
to control).
Many of the differences in national approaches to undercover
work result from choices between electronic surveillance and undercover infiltration. As we learn from Jean-Paul Brodeur, Canada conducts many fewer undercover investigations than the U.S. (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 18, 76-77). But Canadian authorities authorize twenty
times as many wiretaps as the U.S. government, for a population much
smaller than our own (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 18). Indeed, most
Western European countries discussed in these anthologies make it
significantly easier to obtain authorization for electronic surveillance
than we do (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 286-87). Moreover, most of the
countries surveyed limit undercover investigations to crimes that are
serious enough to warrant the intrusiveness of covert infiltration and
that may not be effectively investigated by less intrusive means (such
as electronic surveillance). These are known as the principles of "proportionality" and "subsidiarity."'
This reverses our own norms. In the United States, undercover
investigations need not be the last resort. In fact, they may be one of
the first. On the other hand, we must satisfy our own principles of
proportionality and subsidiarity to obtain authorization for electronic
surveillance." Before obtaining such authorization, the government
must establish the seriousness of the offenses being investigated
(which must be drawn from a list of offenses eligible for investigation
through electronic surveillance)." The applicant must further show
that the wiretap is necessary and that no less intrusive means will suffice. 7 The government typically makes this showing by adducing evidence gathered through undercover agents and informants."
The use of undercover investigations thus may involve some decision whether to favor interpersonal deception over covert surveil13 Electronic surveillance may supplement undercover infiltration, but will more likely be
used in a more targeted and limited fashion when the police introduce an undercover agent than

when they do not.
14 The Netherlands and Germany further impose some hurdle of reasonable suspicion as a
prerequisite to the initiation of undercover investigations (den Boer, ed, p 104).

15 See 18 USC §§ 2516,2518 (1994).
16 18 USC § 2516.
17

18 USC § 2518.

18 United States Department of Justice U.S. Attorneys' Manual, § 9-7.110, available online
at <http://www.usdoj.govlusao/eousalfoia-reading-roomlusaml> (visited Apr 9, 2002). Marx
questions this ordering of investigative preferences: "If a case for indictment cannot be made before a grand jury, or before a judge for permission to search, wiretap or bug, is it appropriate to
...
[initiate an undercover investigation] for which there is no legal minimum threshold?"
(Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 229).
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lance, as we do, or whether to mandate exactly the reverse. (Notice
that this tradeoff is not inevitable. The Soviet Union placed no restriction on either form of covert policing (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 160),
although Russia has established a nominal ban on unauthorized wiretaps.) The perceived need to balance these intrusions reflects the tensions between two of the values (privacy and autonomy) that covert
operations may compromise. Ironically, by elevating privacy to a fundamental right (den Boer, ed, p 80), the European Convention on
Human Rights lays the groundwork for reversing the European preference for electronic surveillance over undercover infiltration. Because electronic surveillance invades the target's privacy, the European Convention on Human Rights and some European constitutions
(like Article 10 of the Dutch Constitution) require that invasions of
privacy be authorized by formal legislation (den Boer, ed, pp 71-72).
At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights views undercover policing as less intrusive into privacy, because the target knows
that he is engaged in criminal conduct and "that consequently he
[runs] the risk of encountering an undercover police officer whose
task would in fact be to expose him" (den Boer, ed, p 81). It remains to
be seen whether this will lead member states of the European Union
to rethink their preference for electronic surveillance over undercover
infiltration.
D. Tradeoff: Informants versus Undercover Agents
Undercover policing involves tradeoffs between reliance on
trained undercover agents and the use of civilian informants. Marx
notes that the greater distance between undercover agents and their
targets ensures that investigations that rely on undercover agents will
be more objective than those that use informants in the central undercover role (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 319). On the other hand, that distance makes it harder for agents to enter and understand the criminal
milieu (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 319). How different countries strike
the balance between professional and civilian infiltrators depends on a
number of factors. To begin with, it varies with the degree to which police work has become professionalized. The increasing assignment of
covert duties to highly specialized task forces often brings with it a reluctance to employ citizens as undercover operatives (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 149; den Boer, ed, p 11). This emphasis on using trained
agents rather than citizen-informants becomes possible when governments use covert tactics "in a targeted fashion in response to intelligence ...which suggests that a crime is occurring, [rather than] rou-

tinely using them absent specific suspicions" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p
220). As investigators' methods are subjected to tighter controls, the
gap between the methods of police professionals and informants in-
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evitably widens. It is much harder to detect the possibly unlawful inducements and pressures by which informants entice their targets than
it is to monitor the performance of undercover agents. The greater
emphasis on police accountability increases pressure on the police to
reduce their reliance on informants. As Brodeur notes in criticizing
Canada's use of informants, the police may be "licensing informers ...
to commit [more risky] crimes." The police also run the risk that the
informants may turn against their handlers. (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp
89, 95). The secrecy surrounding civilian cooperators also shields informant handling and police misconduct from oversight (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 93-94). For these reasons, the Dutch Commission of Inquiry recommended minimizing the use of informants as a way of ensuring greater control and accountability over undercover investigations as a whole (den Boer, ed, pp 22-23). 9
Investigators prefer to use their own trained personnel because
of a host of practical concerns. Even the best informant can turn out
to be a double agent (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 260). Even if informants do not secretly retain their allegiance to the target (or some
third party), their interests will typically diverge from those of the
agencies that employ them (den Boer, ed, pp 15-16). The most useful
informants are often those who are themselves most deeply implicated in the crimes being investigated (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 320).
The more an investigation relies on informants, the more willing it
must be to reward them either financially, or through favorable plea
bargains, or simply by ignoring or even facilitating their criminal activities as a cost of apprehending the targets. Accordingly, the chairman of the Dutch parliamentary inquiry into undercover investigations recommended that "crimes committed by confidential informants with the knowledge of police and judges should not be allowed"
(den Boer, ed, p 22).2
Despite concerns about accountability and control, there are
powerful reasons for continuing to use informants. Some types of investigations, such as those into money laundering and other financial
crimes, might be difficult to Conduct without "civilian" aid. In calling
for greater British use of undercover tactics to investigate money
laundering, Michael Levi advocates reliance on bank employees as
"undercover assistants," provided that the investigators "regulat[e] the
19 "[I]n too many cases it has become unclear whether ... the police runs [sic] the criminal
informer or whether the criminal informer runs the police ....
This brought the Inquiry Commis-

sion to the conclusion that the State has been taken hostage" (den Boer, ed, p 21).
20 For example, "a truckdriver from a criminal organization willing to act as an informer
who declares that he is driving the truck for a criminal organization and that he will do it again
next week [should] not be allowed to do so.... [He should not be allowed] to commit a new series of criminal activities under police supervision" (den Boer, ed, p 22).
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extent to which [the bank employees] are allowed to encourage people to engage in unlawful acts" (den Boer, ed, p 158). And despite the
risks of using informants, investigators may prefer to use them precisely because "informants are generally freer than law enforcement
agents to stretch some of the guidelines defining appropriate [law enforcement] behavior in the service of the law" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 283).
Informant use may depend on the state's willingness to guarantee
secrecy. Many European countries that consistently use informants
make it difficult for defendants to discover not only the identities of
these cooperators but whether the investigation even involved an informant (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 149-50). This is also true of the
United States. The existence and identities of cooperating persons
need to be disclosed only if they are expected to testify or if they took
direct part in the criminal activity.2' In Britain, on the other hand,
where liberal disclosure rules make informants' identity more readily
discoverable, critics fear that civilian cooperators will become unwilling to supply information to the police (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 210).
Finally, informant use depends on the legal system's willingness to
tolerate deals with cooperating criminals. Such deals may be open or
secret. The Netherlands, where the parliamentary commission of inquiry severely criticized the practice of granting favorable plea bargains to crown witnesses (den Boer, ed, pp 22-23), may follow Denmark in outlawing the use of informants as undercover operatives
(den Boer, ed, p 277). It is not clear, though, to what extent such a
prohibition will simply force the use of such informants underground.
Countries that have authorized plea bargains with informants may
simply have formalized and regulated secret agreements between the
informants and the police-making it possible to secure at least some
punishment for an offender who might simply receive full immunity
absent the intermediate possibility of a negotiated term.
Some of the national differences in the use of informers are hard
to assess, because few countries regulate them (den Boer, ed, p 12).
Even where regulations exist, legal restrictions may only apply to one
category of cooperating persons, but leave unofficial helpers virtually
unregulated. Canada, for example, distinguishes "delators," or crown
witnesses who are granted reduced sentences and financial benefits to
testify, from informants who work undercover and may be granted
complete immunity from prosecution (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 80). Italy, similarly, regulates so-called "pentiti,"2 which are roughly the
21

Identifying information must also be provided if it tends to exculpate the defendant or

impeach a government witness.
22
Recent Italian legislation regulating informants, namely, the "Modifica della disciplina
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equivalent of Canadian "delators." This term does not apply to those
informants who have not yet been formally arrested. Consequently,
these unregulated helpers may assist the police in undercover activity
despite the outright ban that Italian law places on pentiti. And although civilians are prohibited from participating in criminal activity
in an undercover capacity, they may nonetheless play an important but
less visible role in supplying information to undercover agents, arranging introductions, and otherwise influencing the investigation or the
underlying offenses in ways that are difficult for anyone but their
handlers to monitor and control.
Despite these obstacles to understanding the use of informants,
two disparate traditions emerge from the contributions to these anthologies. Marx contrasts a democratic informant culture in societies
with some history of citizen responsibility for community policing and
a tradition of decentralized government with a rival informant culture
in countries with authoritarian governments (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p
328). In the former societies, which include the United States, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Britain, law enforcement agencies make
some use of citizen hotlines (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 23, 189) as a
source of information, while increasingly substituting undercover
agents for informants in any direct operational capacity (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 149, 210; den Boer, ed, pp 22-23). The increasing fungibility and anonymity of the actors in many criminal transactions (particularly drug and money laundering offenses) abets this development
by facilitating the introduction of undercover agents who have no
close personal relationships with the targets.
By contrast, the articles describing the use of undercover
investigations in France, the Soviet Union, and its successor states
depict a very different informant culture. This culture obtains not only
in authoritarian regimes, but also, more generally, in countries with a
strong central government. What characterizes this second informant
culture is its reliance on a pervasive network of citizen spies. In
France, the term "informant" must be understood to include political
parties and trade unions, which consent to be interviewed by the
French police several times a year. The term also encompasses
"noteworthies of the community" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 43) and
concierges, who have traditionally maintained a close relationship
with the police, providing information about the comings and goings
of residents (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 327). In the Soviet Union,
analogous informants included so-called "trusted persons" not directly
employed by the militia or state security services, such as "enterprise
della protezione dipentiti," is available online at <http://vww.unibo.it/crimen/> (visited Apr 9,
2002).
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managers ... telegraph operators, [and] academics . . . report[ing]

popular feeling in professional circles," as well as "observers, consultants, agents of influence and residents ...[who reported] on the popu-

lar mood and opinions of specific personnel" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p
168). Many informants were simply citizens whose job responsibilities
were defined to include cooperation with the police and state security
services, including workplace personnel departments, building commandants, doormen, and watchmen (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 162).2
This tradition of implicating the citizenry as informants has its
counterpart in an increasing willingness, both in France and in the Soviet Union and its successor states, to employ undercover agents in
ways that target the workplace, personal relationships, and political
organizations in addition to criminal networks.7 France used undercover agents of the security services to infiltrate demonstrations and
then provoke violence and destroy property (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
pp 32-33). These agents also spied on opposition political parties and
infiltrated unions and workplaces in order to monitor the potential for
unrest, forestall the occupation of factory floors, or call in the riot police in anticipation of protests (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 34). In the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia, security personnel worked undercover to monitor political beliefs, workplace mores, and social relationships in virtually all sectors of society (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 167).
The French, Soviet, and post-Soviet intelligence agencies are
hardly unique in their use of undercover tactics for political ends.
Nonetheless, the Montjardet and Levy article about France (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, pp 29-53), like the Shelley article about Soviet and
post-Soviet Russia (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 155-74), suggests a possible contrast between the first kind of informant culture and the second. In the first, a growing central state asserts its authority against
the older, decentralized tradition of community policing by concentrating the use of deceptive stratagems and undercover powers in a
specialized professional cadre. In such a setting, the use of informants
circumvents legal and administrative constraints on official undercover activity. By contrast, the second informant culture may be associated with an already self-confident central state, where the clear
23 The network's pervasiveness can be inferred from the passage of Russian legislation in
1992, newly prohibiting the police from recruiting "legislators, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
judges, [and] priests," while allowing these services to continue to recruit doctors and journalists,
who were traditionally considered "arms of the state" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 171).
24 Unlike their French counterparts, Soviet and post-Soviet informants not only supplied
intelligence but also conducted surveillance, redirected behavior through various forms of social
control, and participated in undercover operations by "posing as electrical employees or utility
personnel to enter apartments and elicit information from neighbors" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p
163).
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separation of police from community may be taken for granted. In
such a setting, the pervasive use of informants in the same realms
where undercover agents operate suggests that informants do not substitute for agents so much as lay the groundwork for their more effective deployment.
E.

Tradeoff: Intelligence Gathering versus Collecting Evidence for
Criminal Enforcement

In all countries surveyed in the den Boer anthology as well as the
Fijnaut and Marx volume, the criminal enforcement agencies are not
the only organizations performing undercover operations. There are
the shadowy state security services. And there are private security
agencies, who have traditionally performed covert functions (such as
the Pinkerton agents who played such a large role in the suppression
of American labor movements) (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 11). In authorizing undercover operations for the police, governments draw on
practices that have long antecedents in security and counterespionage
work as well as in private policing, even when such powers are new as
a weapon against crime. Governments must make two significant jurisdictional decisions about how to allocate and control covert operations: first, how to demarcate the powers of police officials from those
of the intelligence services; and second, whether to license undercover
work by private or semiprivate entities.
Like the United States, most of the countries surveyed grant significant covert powers to their state security services, often through
separate laws that make it easier for state security services than for
criminal investigators to obtain warrants for electronic surveillance.2
Statutes governing undercover work by criminal investigators sometimes limit permissible objectives to the gathering of evidence (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, p 256; den Boer, ed, pp 103-04, 107). By contrast, the
covert operations of state security investigations may be more openended. They may gather intelligence without expecting to use that information as evidence in a criminal prosecution (Fijnaut and Marx,
eds, p 256).2 In addition to the powers they grant to their intelligence
branches, some countries also permit covert operations to be performed by private or semiprivate security agencies. Examples include
25 (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 257) (Sweden); (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 48 n 26) (stating that
nonjudicial French warrants are available only for the promotion of national security, "the protection of national economic and scientific interests," or the investigation of terrorism and organized crime, not for ordinary criminal violations); (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 287) (stating that
throughout Europe, "[tihe broad exception to all restrictions on electronic surveillance is na-

tional security").
26 In Sweden, for example, national security concerns are often invoked to justify unrelated
investigations peripheral to an agency's ostensible concerns (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 254).

1518

The University of Chicago Law Review

[69:1501

Canada's Hydro-Qu6bec, which has a mandate to infiltrate aboriginal
saboteurs of hydroelectric projects (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 75); Britain's semiprivate Post Office Investigation Department (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 204), which uses covert tactics to observe the activities of
British postal workers; and France's past reliance on private companies to install judicial wiretaps (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 48 n 26).
Whether private or public, these parallel undercover organizations create a dilemma for governments seeking to make covert tactics
available to criminal investigators. If the state imposes greater restrictions on the police than on private or state security agencies, the police may invoke the aid of these parallel agencies to evade such constraints. This temptation becomes more acute in countries, such as
Germany, that allow evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions even
when that evidence has been gathered by state security services using
tactics forbidden to the police (den Boer, ed, p 31). State security
agencies and private organizations "carry out tasks that government
agencies are unable or unwilling to undertake" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 305). Such initiatives "spring up as a result of constraints on government bodies that are perceived as unreasonable" (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 305).
Even when the state security branches are subjected to the same
constraints as the police, their violations of legal norms for the conduct of investigations may escape detection. The activities of state security services may not result in criminal prosecutions and may therefore not be subject to judicial oversight. In Sweden, Tollborg notes,
ambient surveillance is a criminal offense for police and security services alike. Nonetheless, the security police make extensive use of ambient bugs (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 260-61) because of a legal loophole that permits the importation and possession of such devices,
which the security police routinely obtain for "educational purposes"
(Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 260-61).
The confluence of undercover tactics available to the police and
the intelligence branches may also lead to a blurring of the distinction
between political and criminal policing. Most countries surveyed developed their operational expertise in the state security agency's investigation of political dissidence and terrorism before exporting
those tactics to the police (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 4-6, 142-43,273).
Criminal enforcement agencies gradually shift from gathering evidence to gathering intelligence as infiltration becomes an end in itself.
As criminal investigators adopt undercover tactics, Marx observes, the
police and the state security services become more alike (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 336).
But while criminal policing acquires more of the covert powers
hitherto reserved to the state security services, the activities of the
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state security services remain subject to fewer legal constraints and
less accountable for transgressing those that apply to them. The
greater leeway given to the intelligence branches enables governments to shelter illicit practices from judicial oversight by shifting such
practices to the state security services. The tolerated illegalities in turn
provide a continual impetus to legalize tacitly accepted practices.
Montjardet and Levy illuminate the process by which France gradually legalized administrative wiretaps (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 4748). Though illegal, these were officially accepted and even regulated
through an authorization procedure controlled directly by the prime
minister (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 47). Like the practice of creating
false passports for undercover operatives, the administrative wiretaps
went from being illegal and unregulated to being illegal and administered through a highly centralized procedure (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 48). Eventually they were legalized and controlled after a scandal
that erupted when the wiretaps became public (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 48).2
F.

Tradeoffs: Protecting Society by Creating Specialized Units
versus Protecting Society from the Abuse of Power by Such Units

While covert tactics have come to pervade policing in the United
States, the Western European democracies have largely confined these
powers to highly specialized forces (within state security agencies and
regular police alike). Undercover operatives often work in secrecy and
isolation from the mainstream of criminal enforcement. The Netherlands, for example, formed interregional serious crime teams to operate in isolation from the rest of the force (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 103
n 1). Gradually shifting their emphasis from evidence gathering to intelligence acquisition, they came to merge many of the functions of
criminal policing and national security (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 104).
In so doing they successfully avoided the "traditional controls of ...
police management and the judiciary" on the one hand and "the oversight apparatus that monitors security and intelligence services" on
the other (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 104). Germany created specialized
undercover units to investigate organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and political crime (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 60-62). These
27
The illegal practice of keeping records on private citizens went through a process of development similar to that of wiretaps. At first, a limited version of record keeping was legalized
while other practices remained illegal. Later, investigators chafing under the remaining constraints on data gathering provided a new impetus to expand the practice beyond legal bounda-

ries and then to ratify that expansion (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 47-48). Tollborg gives a similar
account of the push to legalize illegal wiretaps and video surveillance in Sweden, which the intel-

ligence community freely deployed, despite the official ban on their use, until new legislation was
proposed to legitimate the practice (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 261).
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tasks were separated from routine police work. Germany segregated
the specialized units from regular police units and provided them with
their own computer networks, which were inaccessible to the rest of
the criminal investigation department.2
Belgium and France also sought to control undercover investigations by concentrating these activities in specialized units. France tried
to limit the power of some of these specialized forces by withholding
from them many of the routine coercive powers of the uniformed police. In Montjardet and Levy's account of French policing, the Renseignements G6ndraux, a branch of the political police, is entrusted with
a "battery" of undercover capabilities, but may not stop or interrogate
suspects, conduct searches, or employ other conventional tactics (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 34-37). Instead, they must pass their information to the judicial police (charged with enforcement of the criminal
laws) and leave the follow-up to them (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 3435). Conversely, the Gendarmerie Nationale (whose mission is the
maintenance of public safety and the enforcement of the criminal
laws) must act openly and in uniform and may generally not dissimulate their activities or take on secret missions (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
pp 42-43). The Customs Service may infiltrate drug trafficking networks, create storefront money laundering operations, and open bank
accounts for drug traffickers, but with the official aim of compelling
compliance with administrative regulations, rather than for purposes
of criminal prosecution (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 44-45). The Judicial
Police, which is the primary body charged with the investigation of
criminal offenses, must comply with the Code of Criminal Procedure
and has more restricted undercover capabilities, which are subject to
judicial oversight and to the threat that illegally gathered evidence
will be excluded (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 38-40).
If countries form specialized units to prevent the diffusion of
tainted practices, the creation of such units may itself generate expansions or abuses of covert powers. Prohibiting the Gendarmerie Nationale from conducting undercover operations may be designed to
control the dissemination of undercover power and the associated
risks of abuse. The restrictions on the Customs Service and the Renseignements Gdn6raux may be designed to avoid too great a concentration of power in any one agency. And the constraints on the undercover activities of the Judicial Police may be designed to ensure a divide between the undercover capacities of those who are charged with
2S These special units were also given the authority to order regular officers to abandon
certain investigations and to collect information from patrol officers without sharing their own
intelligence (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 61). They alone were authorized to delay arrests in order to
infiltrate a criminal network and detect higher level offenders. They alone were allowed to create
false documents and to assume an undercover identity (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 60-62).

2002]

Tradeoffs in UndercoverInvestigations

1521

enforcement of the criminal laws and those who protect the national
gecurity. As a practical matter, however, Montjardet and Levy point
out that these jurisdictional divisions have not done much to stem the
abuse of undercover operations or unofficial expansions of their official powers, at least in those branches not subject to judicial oversight
and the discipline of the exclusionary rule. Unable to interrogate,
search, or arrest, the Renseignements G6n6raux use intelligence they
collect to intimidate politicians (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 35-36).
Though officially prohibited from going undercover, officers of the
Gendarmerie Nationale receive special exemptions to wear civilian
clothing and infiltrate terrorist networks (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 43,
47). And the Customs Service is demanding that its agents be made
part of the Judicial Police, which will make it possible for them to
prosecute their targets (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 45).
G. Tradeoff: Embracing Undercover Policing versus Preserving a
Sense of Its Ethical Ambiguity
Separating covert operations from regular police work reinforces
the tendency of most of the surveyed countries (with the exception of
the United States) to reserve undercover investigations for restricted
categories of crime. The decision to adopt but circumscribe undercover tactics rests, first, on a fear of tainting undercover agents with
complicity in the crimes they investigate, and second, on a preference
for deploying intrusive techniques against marginal sectors of society.
Both of these concerns are largely foreign to the United States. In
adopting undercover tactics, European countries seek a clear demarcation, first, between "real" criminal conduct and acts which would be
criminal if not performed undercover, and second, between the targeted (marginal) milieu and the mainstream of society.
1. Protecting agents from the taint of complicity when they
commit crimes in their undercover capacity.
European concerns about police complicity are puzzling to
American observers. In the United States, but almost nowhere else,
entrapment is a defense wholly relieving the defendant from liability.
Most Western European legal systems instead treat entrapment as a
mode of complicity that fails to excuse the target but implicates the
investigator in the crime. Defining entrapment subjectively rather
than objectively (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 275-76), the American test
largely focuses on the offender's predisposition. Even powerful inducements will fall short of entrapment if the offender is predisposed
to commit the crime. By contrast, the offender's predispositions are
less important to European legal systems that focus on the undercover
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agent's complicity (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 196-99). Suppose an
agent offered a suspect too tempting an opportunity to commit a
crime-securing, for instance, essential resources such as hard-to-get
ingredients for a bomb or criminal contacts that the offender would
not have been likely to locate on his own. If so, the agent may be complicit in the attempted crime, despite the target's subjective willingness
to commit it (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 197). Even if the investigator
has not entrapped the target, he may himself have engaged in illegal
conduct by handling contraband, transferring funds, or using false
documents. European legal systems treat such conduct as criminal (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 276-77) unless a law expressly exempts the investigator from liability for specified acts. 29 Many of the contributors
to these volumes contend that the continuing risks of agents being
charged with criminal offenses for what they do undercover creates an
urgent need for legislation that clarifies not only what target crimes
the investigators may participate in undercover but also what incidental crimes undercover agents may commit to maintain their cover (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 64-65, 152-53; den Boer, ed, pp 32-34, 89).
These critics decry the present need for ad hoc legal justifications,
such as "supra-legal emergencies" and a modified necessity defense, to
relieve agents from potential liability (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 332,
283).Agents incur a risk of criminal liability not only by participating
in crimes undercover, but also by postponing the arrest of targets until
the conclusion of the covert investigation. European police forces also
"have less formal discretion with respect to whether to report an offense and to arrest" than their American counterparts (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 332, 283).' Accordingly, the investigators' failure to arrest the target as soon as the target's involvement in criminal activity
becomes apparent may itself expose the investigators to sanctions. If a
country lacks prosecutorial discretion and requires prosecution of all
apparent offenses committed by police officials and civilians alike, un29 Thus, a British storefront fencing ring that operated undercover to purchase stolen
property came under criticism for complicity in theft. Its activities were ultimately vindicated because the offenses had already been committed when the goods were offered to the agents for
sale and because the targets self-selected themselves by bringing their goods for sale without
prior solicitation (Fijnaut and Marx. eds, pp 197-98). Germany is notable for having gone farther
than many other European countries in creating legal exemptions for undercover investigators,
who may now construct false identities and use false documents to perpetuate their cover.
though only for "crime[s] of significant proportions" (den Boer. ed, p 32). Austria is following
suit (den Boer. ed, p 32-33).
30 Contrast Sweden. which still prohibits false identities and fictitious companies (den
Boer, ed, pp 179-80).
31 In France. the judiciary police arrested French customs agents for engaging in undercover activities that only police officers are currently authorized to conduct (den Boer, ed, pp
152-53).
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dercover operatives may face a very real danger of punishment unless
they confine their activities within legislatively defined bounds (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 332).' In Britain, these risks were heightened
by the residual right of private prosecution, which theoretically permitted victims of entrapment to prosecute investigators as accomplices (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 197)."'
Legal constraints comparable to the duty to arrest without delay
also operate on the undercover support team. Surveillance officers
who monitor undercover activities may be required by law to seize illicit drugs immediately upon identifying them, or to ensure that all
imported goods are properly declared at customs, or to arrest offenders immediately (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 284), instead of allowing
them to operate unimpeded until higher-level offenders can be identified. These interpose significant obstacles to "controlled deliveries,"
(again, a U.S. export), by which investigators covertly shepherded intercepted drug shipments to their ultimate destinations and arrested
its recipients (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 284). The legal obligation to
seize a shipment immediately upon detecting it and to ensure that its
contents were declared whenever it crossed a national boundary made
such operations virtually impossible (or at least illegal) until the
Schengen Convention obligated its European signatories to facilitate
controlled deliveries (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 285; den Boer, ed, pp
168-69,188).Undercover criminal investigations returned to Europe in the
1970s, first as a tactic against terrorism and drug trafficking, then
against organized crime more broadly construed (Fijnaut and Marx,
eds, pp 15, 279-81). Lacking legal protections for their undercover
techniques, operatives adapted their methods to the prevailing twilight
of legitimacy, frequently shielding their activities with a secrecy that
was designed to insulate them from the risks of judicial oversight (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 278, 282). Because the Europeans generally
rejected the American notion that criminal acts "are justifiable and
not criminal when done by a government agent in the reasonable exercise of law enforcement power," the police were legally prohibited
from even "go[ing] through the motions of a criminal act" (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 148, 276, 288, 332). They "could not pretend to take or
32

The Netherlands is an exception to the general principle of compulsory prosecution

(den Boer, ed, p 82).
33 No crime of entrapment exists in Britain, though one has been proposed (Fijnaut and

Marx, eds, p 197).
34 The Schengen Convention establishes the legal underpinnings of national uniformity
and mutual assistance in transborder policing operations that involve controlled deliveries, because it requires the signatories to pass domestic legislation that allows drug shipments to pass

through their countries to their ultimate destination. Unfortunately, the Convention does not
regulate undercover policing generally (den Boer, ed, pp 168-69,188).
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offer a bribe in order to catch a corrupt politician5... [nor] play the
role of a fence ...[nor] assume the guise of a drug trafficker" (Fijnaut

and Marx, eds, p 276). Any such actions made the investigator (including informants) "as guilty as any criminal performing the same act for
real" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 276). According to the law on the
books, the undercover buyer of drugs was as guilty as the seller (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 276). Struggling to overcome "the tendency of
most Europeans to regard all undercover operations as an unacceptable form of entrapment" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 276), American
DEA agents stationed in Europe helped to gain acceptance for undercover methods by going undercover themselves. Often this involved charades. The undercover agent might meet with a dealer to
buy drugs, show the dealer a flashroll of cash, and then run away without the drugs as the Spanish, French, Dutch, or Belgian police arrived
to make the arrest (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 148, 277). The agent
thereby avoids completing a criminal transaction that would have exposed him to sanctions, while allowing local police officials to arrest
the perpetrator. In the ensuing criminal case, police officials and
prosecutors operated with both an official case file and an unofficial
case file in order to avoid disclosing the undercover status of the "fugitive" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 113, 148, 278, 280). Dutch and Belgian judges frequently issued arrest warrants for the missing "accomplice," though usually in the name of his alias (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
pp 148,278).
Gaining acceptance for American undercover tactics required
taming them. Nadelmann's account, The DEA in Europe, describes
the lengthy process by which the DEA eventually persuaded Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands to legitimate undercover
"buy-busts"; to permit illicit deals to be completed and, if necessary,
arrests to be delayed; and finally to authorize domestic police agencies
to act undercover themselves (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 269-89)." But
in accepting such tactics, European governments also set limits on
permitted undercover activities. In this way, the development of European undercover policing diverges most sharply from the relatively
freewheeling American methods. 3 Now that the buy-bust has been le35 Bribery is a clear example of the difference between the European and American approaches to police complicity. Marx describes a public corruption investigation that went badly
awry. An FBI informant offered a bribe to the superintendent of police, who pretended to be interested, then rejected the bribe and arrested the informant. The superintendent sought to have
the FBI agents involved arrested for bribery. In the United States, neither the superintendent nor
the FBI agents were guilty of any crime. In most European legal systems they all would be guilty
of bribery (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 230).
36 Nadelmann notes that such transactions remain deeply problematic in Southern Europe,
particularly France and Spain (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 280).
37 When American investigators discover an opportunity to conduct the functional equiva-
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galized in Europe, it is also being regulated, so that the undercover
"agent may properly be introduced into a situation in which a drug
transaction is going to take place anyway, but he may not create the
situation" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 283).g Nadelmann also notes a
"persistent resistance to the [ ]'buy and bust"' as provocation (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, p 283). 9 The common U.S. practice known as the "reverse buy" (or sale) of drugs, whereby the undercover agent offers to

sell narcotics to the dealer, remains illegal in most of Europe (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, p 283).4 And many European legal systems prohibit
"deep cover" operations (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 149, 283).41 These
involve long-term infiltrations that heighten the risk that an undercover operative will be required to commit criminal acts or otherwise

be corrupted.4 2 Likewise, in legalizing controlled deliveries, European
governments subject them to supervision by prosecutors, who can "require the police to guarantee that they will not lose the drugs once
they walk," and "insist upon an assurance that the courier will be
prosecuted in the destination country" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 285).'
By circumscribing the newly legalized tactics in this way, European
governments sought to preserve some sense of the'ethical ambiguity
of such practices and to avoid the taint of complicity in the targeted
crimes.

lent of a buy-bust with contraband other than drugs, American prosecutors and investigators can
rely on the functional equivalence of the operation to ensure its legality.
33 In the United States, "creating the situation" does not necessarily involve entrapment, as
that term is defined by American jurisprudence. Asking a known dealer to sell some quantity of
cocaine that the seller has yet to acquire need not involve any extraordinary inducement, nor
does it target someone who wouid not otherwise be disposed to engage in such a transaction; but
it does create the situation, by initiating a transaction which would not otherwise have occurred,
even if the dealer routinely conducts similar transactions with other buyers.
39 Belgian regulations provide that the deal must be offered to a third party who notifies
the police and that it must be clear that the transaction would occur even without the police.
They also provide that "the police should be offered enough freedom of movement so that any
criminal activity may be stopped during the operation," which would preclude the routine
American practice of conducting multiple buys of increasing size before arresting the dealer (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 147-48).
40 The point of this operation is to seize the purchaser's money and arrest him for attempting to purchase narcotics. Even in the U.S., internal law enforcement guidelines prohibit agents
from releasing the drugs into the market, though they may show the drugs to the buyer.
41 These limitations on newly legalized practices are counteracted only by the increasing
pressure from criminal investigators to investigate new and broadly defined areas of organized
crime. As European agencies develop new undercover methods to deal with other domains of
criminality, their activities may eventually undergo the same process of reutilization and constraint that has tamed law enforcement practices in the investigation of narcotics offenses.
42 "The struggle [against organized crime] necessarily places policing very close to the
daily work of spies and criminals themselves" (den Boer, ed, p 88).
43 Prosecutors may prefer that the courier be "flipped" before delivering the shipment,
"that the drugs be discreetly seized and that only a small portion of drugs combined with some
innocuous white powder be substituted for the original package" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 285).
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2. Avoiding social taint: demarcating the target by limiting
undercover policing to marginal milieus.
European countries steer undercover investigators' activities to
safely marginal milieus, including the haunts of soccer hooligans in
Britain (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 175-91), Kurdish expatriates in
Sweden (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 257), and drug trafficking networks
everywhere. Gary Armstrong and Dick Hobbs's account of the British
experience with the undercover investigation of soccer hooliganism
(Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 175-93) characterizes the deployment of
undercover agents among soccer hooligans as an effort "to promote
and extend both the tactics and ideology of a pervasive and intrusive
surveillance culture" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 175). Armstrong and
Hobbs contend that the police shrewdly exploited the moral panic
surrounding publicized incidents of violence by British soccer fans to
garner legitimacy for the systematic use of surveillance technology
(often financed by interested pressure groups) and the deployment of
infiltrators and provocateurs in a context not likely to arouse public
condemnation (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 190-91). They argue that the
undercover tactics, including profiles of people "known to keep the
company" of targeted individuals, would have garnered far less support if used against groups such as labor unions (Fijnaut and Marx,
eds, pp 176, 185,191).
Sweden provides another example of covert powers specially designed to target only a marginal milieu. Dennis Tollborg shows that
Swedish law authorizes far more intrusive covert tactics against socially marginal people, particularly "immigrant groups and shadowy
political groups with low social legitimacy" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp
256-58, 266) than against coteries of military officers, politicians, and
policemen whose crimes have particularly serious consequences (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 266). Tollborg also points out that the Swedish
Terrorism Act provides the police with virtual carte blanche in wiretapping deportable and incarcerated aliens, while placing significant
limitation on the application of similar measures against citizens (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 256-58).
Why are the socially marginal treated differently than powerful
groups? Tollborg suggests that Swedish police fear using undercover
methods against the elite, because "[tihe price of failure for the investigators in such cases is so high that it is not worth the risk" (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, p 266). In their account of international undercover policing, Nikos Passas and Richard Groskin suggest that undercover
work may be harder "when the targets ... can manipulate political

power elites" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 305). Marx offers another explanation. Europeans focus on immigrants, foreigners, and on targets
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not well integrated into the community because the governments possess significant overt coercive powers in dealing with citizens (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, pp 331-32). These methods include compulsory registration and the requirement that all citizens carry identification at all
times (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 332). There is less perceived need to
apply the new surveillance tactics to the mainstream.
In many respects, the United States has followed a different path
than Europe. Undercover investigations are unhampered by concerns
about agent complicity or constraints on whom investigators may target. Americans treat the entrapment defense as a sufficient legal constraint on undercover conduct. Prosecutorial discretion ensures that
criminal liability remains confined to those undercover agents who
shift their loyalties to the law breakers or who pursue their own illegal
objectives (such as theft or extortion). Turf issues aside, American investigators are subject to no comparable subject matter constraints on
the sorts of crimes they may investigate or the types of milieus they
may infiltrate. Assisted by the breadth of legal concepts such as the
"racketeering enterprise," which includes licit and illicit organizations
alike, American investigators target more than the criminal activities
of "lower status and marginal groups" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 13).
American agencies routinely investigate white collar crime, frequently
focusing on mainstream and elite institutions like the financial trade
and health care industries, and even government itself (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 13, 213). Because American agencies face fewer constraints than European agencies, they can pursue freewheeling and
unfocused investigations. Consider Abscam, in which members of
Congress were persuaded to accept bribes from an "Arab sheikh"
(who was in fact an undercover FBI agent) (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 224). Quoting a U.S. senate report, Marx describes Abscam as
"'unlimited in geographic scope, persons to be investigated, [and]
criminal activity to be investigated"' (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 224)."
The FBI did not initiate Abscam in response to any allegations about
particular individuals or known offenses (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p
224). While critics decried what they viewed as entrapment, no undercover agent was prosecuted for complicity in the crimes, which the
critics branded an artifact of the investigation.
If the systematic targeting of marginal milieus diminishes accountability, Marx's account of American use of covert tactics against
mainstream violators suggests that the wider use of such techniques is
also fraught with peril." The risks of misuse and political targeting are
44 Quoting Select Committee to Study Law Enforcement Undercover Activities of Components of the Department of Justice, Hearings,Law Enforcement UndercoverActivities (GPO
1983).
45 To be sure, the "collusive nature of many official violations operate against [their] dis-
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significant (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 228). While more likely to invite
popular scrutiny than the limited use of such tactics against marginal
groups, undercover investigation of the mainstream creates a "culture
of surveillance" that may undermine workplace morale and (as Levinson fears) create a climate of suspicion that undermines social relationships.
H. Tradeoff: Accommodating the Selection of Law Enforcement
Goals, the Definition of Offenses, and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence to Undercover Tactics versus Retaining Some
Independent Measure of Whether Covert Tactics Work
Undercover investigations should be accountable. But what are
the proper criteria for measuring accountability? Ideally, policymakers
evaluate undercover tactics by asking a series of questions. Are the
ends of an investigation important enough to justify the intrusiveness
of the means? Could the ends be better served by conventional police
tactics? These questions are easier to pose than to answer. Measuring
undercover tactics against the ends that justify them is difficult because "success" is a moving target. Investigative tactics (the means) influence the formulation of the law enforcement goals (the ends) used
to judge the success and propriety of the tactics. The difficulty here is
not that the ends justify the means so much as that the means help
create the ends by which they are evaluated.
How do undercover tactics shape the ends by which these investigative means are justified? Consider Armstrong and Hobbs's account of undercover efforts against soccer hooligans in Britain. Armstrong and Hobbs argue that the British government presented undercover tactics to the public in order to dramatize the fight against crime
in highly personal terms (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 176, 185). The government celebrated the heroic and risky elements of undercover infiltration (for example, of "soccer hooligans") over the "boring, routine"
aspects of conventional police work (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 176,
185). Dramatization of this struggle, partly through elaborate trials of
soccer hooligans, enhanced the status of the investigator as it demonized his target. The spectacle of infiltration and secret surveillance fueled the perception that the hooligans against whom these tactics
were arrayed must be sophisticated and well-organized (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 186-90). This belief in turn justified the undercover tactics, despite the relative absence of proof that the violence had really
been orchestrated by an organized core of ringleaders. One might
speak, in this instance, of the undercover means justifying the endcovery and prosecution," and covert methods may be the only effective way of revealing public
corruption (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 219).
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namely, the capture of dangerous "organized" criminals conceived to
be dangerous and organized because of the tactics deployed against
them.
Another way in which undercover operations ensure their own
success is by affecting the behavior of their targets. In his account of
Swedish efforts to infiltrate "dangerous" dissenting groups, Tollborg
argues that the covert methods themselves demonize the secretive
targets as conspiratorial (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 267). The very process of investigation drives such groups underground (which makes
them look guiltier and more dangerous) while reinforcing "paranoid"
convictions among the targets that "their fear [of the government is]
justified" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 267). This may well radicalize the
targeted groups, confirming the need for infiltration while "contributing to the security problems" these methods are designed to detect
(Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 267). Similar phenomena are familiar in the
United States, where stalled investigations may generate perjury, retaliation against suspected informants, or obstruction of justice, and
thus may prove "successful" after all.
To ensure that their efforts will be accounted a success, or simply
to avoid being judged, undercover investigators must be flexible about
their goals. Investigators may choose to define their success by their
ability to infiltrate a target organization and gather "intelligence"
rather than by their ability to gather evidence for trial (which will put
an end to the covert investigation) (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 119-22).
The information collected may be used to prosecute other, higherlevel targets, to prevent future crimes, to infiltrate other, worthier targets, or to disband the organization at some future date, or it may simply become an end in itself. The need to preserve secrecy and protect
the identity of informants and agents may further divert police efforts
from evidence to intelligence. Criminal investigations that rely on undercover tactics may thus gain bureaucratic approval while resisting
more stringent judicial oversight, converging in this way with the undercover operations of state security services (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 336). Why spoil a successful infiltration by bringing criminal
charges?
Investigators' ability to choose when and how to terminate an
undercover investigation also enables them to influence the criteria by
which they are judged. Undercover investigations may lead to arrests,
convictions, and seizures of contraband. Statistics concerning the volume of seized contraband and the number of persons arrested encourage the perception that undercover methods work, even if the investigation itself helped expand the market for the contraband and
encouraged crimes by the targeted suspects (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 298). Icelandic drug investigations provide an example of under-
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cover investigations that appear successful on their own terms (resulting in seizures and arrests) but feed off a largely invented drug problem. Iceland is a society in which less than four percent of all emergencies involving intoxication involve illegal drugs and in which there
has never been a single death from a drug overdose (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 245).
Part of the difficulty in judging the success of undercover operations derives from the inherent tension between preventing crime and
allowing it to continue (temporarily) in the service of a larger end. The
seizure of a drug shipment may be counted as a success because it
precluded distribution on the street. However, the seizure may also
represent failure if it terminated undercover efforts before agents
traced the delivery to its intended recipient. The tension between detection and prevention and the need to choose between them may
well give investigators the option to adapt their announced objectives
to their results, thereby ensuring success. For example, the pressure for
''results" at the end of a fiscal year or presidential term may produce
seizures that validate the investigation but undermine promising longterm in-depth investigations (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 306). Responding to such pressures, investigators can conceal the opportunity cost of
a premature drug seizure (which cuts off hope of arranging bigger
deals with prominent dealers) by emphasizing their success in preventing the shipment from reaching the market. The plurality of possible objectives makes it possible to ensure success by guiding the selection of goals by which the results will be judged.
A criminal conviction is not a truly independent measure of
whether undercover tactics are effective. Covert policing influences
the interpretation of the substantive criminal law by which investigative results will be judged. In corruption cases, in particular, the definition of a crime may well be an artifact of the investigation. Suppose
undercover investigators target activities such as patronage that are at
the margin of tolerated practices, but that are not clearly criminal (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 229). In such cases, conviction may not be a
truly independent gauge of the success of undercover tactics. The targeted conduct whose criminal nature supposedly validates covert tactics may be defined as corrupt by the guilty pleas of suspects who cooperate early in the investigation. The suspects may be responding to
newly created applications of malleable federal offenses such as the
mail fraud statute. They may be pleading guilty in exchange for sizeable penalty reductions. Their convictions establish a precedent for the
criminality of conduct that subsequent suspects will find it harder to
contest.
The substantive criminal law accommodates undercover tactics
and ensures their success in the courtroom in many other ways. Un-
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dercover tactics uncover crime, because the substantive criminal law
expands the definitions of the criminal phenomena (such as "racketeering") to ratify the criminality of infiltrated organizations and
criminalize the conduct of peripheral actors (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 215). Britain deployed undercover agents against unruly soccer fans
as a way of testing new theories of liability, including "conspiracy to
cause an affray," in settings in which they had never previously been
applied (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 176). Likewise, the law of impossibility and the development of inchoate offenses, including conspiracy
and attempt, ensure the availability of a legal theory criminalizing
conduct that did not attain its criminal ends. If the infiltrator's intention of frustrating a planned offense renders its completion impossible, the target is still guilty of solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt.
Likewise, limits on the entrapment defense insulate many undercover
tactics from challenge. Not least, undercover investigations yield corroborating testimony from offenders because rising penalties encourage cooperation with the government (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 20).
Procedural and evidentiary rules also validate undercover methods at trial. Undercover tactics produce convictions because judges
admit into evidence secretly recorded conversations and hearsay testimony,' approve plea bargains with convicted coconspirators and informants, protect the identity of informants who operated on the periphery of an undercover investigation, and permit cooperating defendants to testify under penalty of perjury.7 In myriad ways, the legal
system accommodates undercover tactics, adapting evidentiary and
procedural rules and amplifying the substantive criminal law to vindicate police efforts at trial. In examining recent changes in European
criminal law and procedure, it may be worth examining the extent to
which legislation expanding the covert powers of the police has accompanied favorable definitions of organized crime, a greater willingness to accept negotiated guilty pleas, harsher penalty structures, new
rules governing the status and use of informants, and rules of evidence
adapted to the products of undercover work.
Undercover operations also ensure their success by shaping the
definition of the criminal phenomena that they are charged with investigating. Instead of only investigating crimes defined by the sub-

46
In the United States, they do so under the co-conspirator hearsay exception at trial and
without need of such an exception at sentencing, since the rules of evidence often do not apply.
FRE 801(d)(2)(E); Williams v New York, 337 US 241,249, 251 (1949) (emphasizing the distinctions in evidentiary procedure between the trial and sentencing process, and noting that the Constitution does not restrict the view of the sentencing judge to information received in open
court); United States Sentencing Commission, GuidelinesManual § 6A1.3(a) (GPO 1997).
47 Systems that allow witnesses to lie about their guilt do not produce effective

government witnesses.
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stantive criminal law, police officials are increasingly given a broad
mandate to investigate criminal networks, whose contours the investigators themselves delineate during the course of their infiltration. In
Germany, for example, vague definitions of organized crime and a
broad conception of preliminary crime fighting give investigators the
flexibility to respond quickly to new kinds of organized crime. The
breadth of this mandate "transform[s] the legally defined reality of the
criminal offense into a world of crime defined by the police" (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, p 67). The definition of organized crime, which provides the primary limit on investigative powers, becomes the responsibility of administrative experts. By controlling the definition of the
phenomenon they investigate, the police control the criteria for evaluating the success of their tactics.
The dangers of allowing the police to define the terms by which
to evaluate their success were most evident in the Soviet Union, with
its 98 percent conviction rate in the late 1980s (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
p 165).4 Undercover operations were spectacularly successful on their
own terms, namely, in protecting the interests of the state. Such methods were also virtually costless to those who discounted the invasion
of privacy or individual rights as a legitimate problem (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 160). The Soviet Union, which criminalized so much ordinary behavior (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 162, 164), also provides an
excellent example of how crimes can be defined and innocuous behavior criminalized to enlarge the focus of investigative attention (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, p 164). To the extent that the desire to accommodate
the new investigative methods drives the many adaptations of substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence that produce
success in the courtroom, undercover investigations have succeeded in
shaping the measures by which they are judged.
III.

TRANSNATIONAL UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS: THE TENSION
BETWEEN NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND EFFECTIVE COOPERATION

Countries undertake covert investigations not only domestically
but transnationally (in conjunction with other countries). Transnational operations are sometimes pursued by multination task forces,
but more often arise when one country seeks the assistance of another
with what had started as a domestic matter.' 9 Conducting undercover
48 That figure was down from a 99.8 percent conviction rate during earlier years of the Soviet era (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 160).
49 Cross-border investigations not only infiltrate transnational crime networks through undercover agents and informants (who pose as storefront money laundering operations for drug
dealers, or as high-level arms dealers, or as corrupt bankers, businessmen, and the like) (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, pp 197-99,293-96). They also include controlled deliveries of intercepted drug or
arms shipments and the pursuit, tracking, and electronic surveillance of suspects (FiJnaut and
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investigations across national borders complicates the policy choices
facing national decisionmakers and threatens to undercut each country's efforts to develop its own approach to covert policing. At the
same time, each nation's interest in making its own policy choices
about covert policing impedes international cooperation and makes
transnational undercover investigations more difficult.
Transnational operations undermine national autonomy by creating pressure for greater uniformity of laws across borders. Countries
that cooperate in covert policing also try to coordinate on a host of
ancillary issues (a process that requires abandonment of distinct or
idiosyncratic approaches). These countries typically seek agreement:
(a) on the crimes that may be targeted through undercover activity;
(b) on how to define those crimes; (c) on whether to permit foreign
agents and informants to act undercover; (d) on what crimes agents
may commit in their undercover capacity; (e) on whether agents may
use false documentation; (f) on when to authorize electronic surveillance; (g) on whether to allow foreign drug shipments to pass through
without arresting the courier; and (h) on whether certain undercover
intrusions require judicial warrants or high-level approval within government ministries (den Boer, ed, pp 92-93, 104-05). All of this requires cooperating countries to harmonize both their substantive
criminal law and their criminal procedure.
Transnational operations also undercut national autonomy by
circumventing domestic constraints on undercover policing. Police in
one country can use foreign undercover operatives to accomplish by
proxy what they themselves cannot do directly. Agents from one
country may choose to conduct prohibited undercover operations in a
neighboring country that imposes fewer restrictions-a practice
known as "forum shopping" (den Boer, ed, pp 42, 174-75). Investigators may also "launder" information received from unreliable sources
by transferring it to a foreign law enforcement agency and then bringing it back as a report from that agency (den Boer, ed, p 166). Worse,
an investigative method that was improper in the country in which it
was used may produce information that is admitted as evidence in another country (den Boer, ed, pp 175-76). Some European legal systems do not apply an exclusionary rule for evidence illegally obtained
elsewhere (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 331; den Boer, ed, p 176). Many
countries do not require that the prosecution disclose the legality of
Marx, eds, p 284). These investigations target organized crime, money laundering, drug traffick-

ing, and alien smuggling, as well as terrorism and other offenses against national security (Fijnaut
and Marx, eds, pp 303-04; den Boer, ed, pp 92,119,151).
50

Peter Tak voices this concern about the future of Dutch policing, if the Parliament re-

sponds to the recommendations of the Inquiry Committee by giving fewer powers to the Dutch
police than their foreign counterparts enjoy (den Boer, ed, p 42).
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the means used to obtain information abroad. British courts, for example, have allowed prosecutors to introduce into evidence transcripts
of conversations that were illegally taped by the DEA in France (den
Boer, ed, pp 175-76). And some treaties between the United States
and other nations go so far as to provide that "defendants cannot
submit a complaint concerning the irregularity of the evidence that
has been obtained pursuant to the [Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty]"
(den Boer, ed, p 176). Investigators may therefore escape domestic
controls by conducting their operations in another country where they
are legal, or by ensuring that defendants will be tried in jurisdictions
where the illegality of a technique deployed abroad carries no adverse
consequences for the prosecution. By undercutting national controls,
these methods of evasion provide a powerful impetus to harmonize
approaches among groups of countries-an impetus perhaps more
powerful than any diplomatic initiative.
If transnational undercover investigations threaten national
autonomy, it is no less true that national autonomy and national differences make cross-border cooperation more difficult. In the terminology of Christine van den Wyngaert, cooperation may be "horizontal" or "vertical" (den Boer, ed, pp 166-68). Horizontal cooperation
requires investigators to coordinate national monitoring bodies of different countries. This becomes difficult when some states place less reliance than others on an investigating judge, when one country has no
clear counterpart to another country's monitoring agency, or when the
counterpart agencies have different powers (den Boer, ed, pp 166-67).
In addition, cooperating investigators will inevitably encounter uncertainties about whether to coordinate their activities at the police level
or the judicial level (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 172-73). Often that
choice depends on whether coercive measures (such as arrests and seizures) must be taken, or whether there will be an infringement of the
European Convention's "fundamental right" of privacy (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, pp 171-73). But not all countries require judicial approval
for the same invasive measures. It may be unclear to investigators
whether they need to seek a judicial warrant or may cooperate informally with their foreign police counterparts (Fijnaut and Marx, eds,
pp 172-73).
By contrast, vertical cooperation relies on transnational organizations, such as the European Union's Europol or anti-fraud unit, Unit6
de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Fraude (UCLAF) (den Boer, ed,
p 167). In the future, the European Union may exercise vertical controls through a European prosecutor charged with balancing federal
and national powers and ensuring compliance with the European
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Convention on Human Rights (den Boer, ed, p 167). 5' However, this
form of vertical coordination appears possible only in a transnational
legal space such as the European Union, and may encounter the resistance of member states even there.
The contributors to the volumes under review disagree about the
prospects for overcoming national variation in the regulation of undercover policing. The authors consider two different ways of reducing
national distinctiveness in the service of improving international cooperation. First, cooperating nations could agree to adopt and be
bound by transnational norms defining permissible undercover conduct (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 27, 308, 324; den Boer, ed, pp 129-31,
151-52, 181-82, 191). Second, they could agree voluntarily to bring
their domestic regulation of undercover policing into harmony with
other countries' approaches (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 27, 324; den
Boer, ed, pp 22-24,188-89,191).
The first way of overcoming national differences requires highlevel cooperation through negotiated agreements. This approach has
advantages. It would "accommodate disparate political views," specify
the "cases when assistance may be denied," and set forth the relative
responsibilities of cooperating states (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 308;
den Boer, ed, pp 199-201).
This vertical mechanism of cooperation would only work under
certain conditions. Participating countries would need to fashion international norms about what crimes to target, how to collect evidence, when to apply for a judicial warrant, and what the police may
do undercover (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 308; den Boer, ed, pp 199200). Passas and Groskin foresee difficulty in reaching agreement
about which crimes to target through transnational operations (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, pp 303-04). While countries cooperate readily in
international money laundering investigations (which may produce financial rewards to the investigating countries), their agreement seems
confined to the pursuit of drug money52 (although it may now be extended to terrorist funds). Most treaties and conventions that promote
international cooperation exempt the laundering of proceeds from
crimes such as tax evasion, corruption, capital flight, arms trafficking,
and smuggling (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 303). Indigenous and ideologically motivated crime has until recently produced little interna51 For covert operations, this means ensuring compliance with the Convention's guarantee
of privacy as a fundamental right, which may require member states to impose greater restric-

tions on electronic surveillance (den Boer, ed, pp 167-68).

52 As of the publication of the Fijnaut and Marx anthology, Turkey had not yet recognized
even drug money laundering as a criminal offense, and its bank secrecy laws, which permitted
anonymous accounts, made it easier to shelter the proceeds of criminal activity (Fijnaut and
Marx, eds, p 303).
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tional cooperation, "unless the terrorist acts are considered crimes in
the countries from which information and assistance is requested" (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 304). "International terrorism attracts ... more

support and cooperation," they note presciently, particularly as cooperating countries perceive that they may themselves become targets of
the terrorists (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 304).
Despite these obstacles to the creation of international norms,
there have been many calls to bridge national differences by federalizing criminal law and procedure within the European Union. Germany
has pushed to federalize undercover policing and organized crime
within the European Union, advocating that Europol (which currently
investigates drug crimes, money laundering, and alien smuggling) be
turned into a pan-European police force with proactive covert powers
analogous to those of the federated German police bureau and the
American FBI (den Boer, ed, pp 132-41). Brice De Ruyver, Gert
Vermeulen, and Tom Vander Beken advocate the creation of "a 'centralized' system in which every Member State could be represented by
..liaison officers... [and] liaison magistrates" to test the legitimacy

of undercover activities ahead of time (den Boer, ed, p 148). Jtirgen
Storbeck, the Coordinator of the Europol Unit in the Netherlands,
proposes to staff Europol with public prosecutors from each member
state to coordinate transnational undercover investigations (den Boer,
ed, pp 127-28). Van den Wyngaert believes that the European Parliament may be willing to create a separate European Prosecutor's Office for the investigation and prosecution of fraud against the European Community (den Boer, ed, pp 167-68).
Fijnaut and Verbruggen take the federal idea further yet in
weighing the merits of creating a single European-wide statute on organized crime (den Boer, ed, p 137). Modeled on the American RICO
statute, 3 the European organized crime statute would require individual predicate violations (establishing a "pattern" akin to the American
"pattern of racketeering activity") (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p 137).
These violations would be determined under the law of the country
where the predicate crimes were committed (Fijnaut and Marx, eds, p
137). The European-wide definition of organized crime might invite
formulation of uniform transnational principles governing undercover
investigations of such offenses.
But Fijnaut and Verbruggen see risks in this approach and conclude that predictions about a federalized European criminal law and
procedure are premature. They warn that laws broadly defining transnational criminal conduct could be used against unintended targets
(de Boer, ed, p 137). They also observe that subjecting a federalized
53

18 USC §§ 1961 et seq (1994).
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criminal law and procedure to interpretation by the European Court
of Justice would break with the principle "that national judges should
be the primary guards of Community law, with the [European Court
of Justice] monitoring harmonious interpretation" (den Boer, ed, p
138). The European Union, the authors contend, is not yet a "real"
federal government with a democratic mandate (den Boer, ed, pp 13435).

Fijnaut and Verbruggen also doubt that the member states will be
willing to entrust a federal European police force with the proactive
powers necessary to investigate transnational or international crime.
Fijnaut and Verbruggen believe that the Task Force for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention ("UCLAF"), the European police force in
charge of investigating fraud against the European Union, is more
likely than Europol to acquire such powers, since Europol is mainly
responsible for the exchange of intelligence, training, and technical
support (den Boer, ed, pp 140-41). (Under the Maastricht Treaty, the
European community, through UCLAF, has the right of initiative in
combating international fraud, while the member states have the right
of initiative for all other crimes (den Boer, ed, p 151).) With no operational powers of its own and no mandate to initiate criminal investigations except for international fraud (den Boer, ed, pp 134, 136-37,
151-53), Europol currently exists purely to support the investigative
activities of its member states (den Boer, ed, pp 117-21,134). Absent a
truly democratic mandate from the European Parliament and absent
an operational mandate for a federal European police force to initiate
its own undercover investigations, Fijnaut and Verbruggen doubt that
European criminal investigation and law will be federalized anytime
soon. (It is worth noting, however, that the European Union has recently agreed on a uniform definition of terrorism.-, Further agreements of this nature may lie ahead.)
Willy Bruggeman is more optimistic than Fijnaut and Verbruggen
about the prognosis for overcoming each nation's attachment to
autonomous policies. He contends that a certain "Europeanization" of
law enforcement will be the inevitable result of abolishing internal
borders within the European Union (den Boer, ed, p 191). His approach marks a second "horizontal" means of overcoming national
differences-a "Europeanization" that will not result from countries
formally adopting international norms, but will grow up incrementally
as nations agree to change their domestic regulation of undercover
policing to align better with each other's policies. Within the framework of the Maastricht Treaty, national governments should appeal to
54
55

Europol and UCLAF answer to the European Parliament (den Boer, ed, p 138).
Edward Taylor, EuropeAnnounces AntiterrorMeasures,Wall St JA16 (Dec 7,2001).
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each other to formulate compatible rules about what offenses may be
targeted by undercover investigations, about what level of factual
predication is necessary to initiate such investigations, about what
forms of undercover activity are permissible, and about who should
hold investigators accountable (den Boer, ed, pp 191-92). Bruggeman
believes that European institutions can encourage these domestic developments. To avoid competition among the police forces of different
legal systems, a European Union fund should "remunerate police
forces that make a substantial contribution to a criminal case" when
these result in no direct arrests or seizure within the contributing
country (den Boer, ed, p 195). Bruggeman also advocates creating a
federal prosecuting agency for the European Union and reforming
Europol to ensure that it clearly tags the provenance and reliability of
all information that may be used as evidence in criminal prosecutions.
With these reforms, he believes that the ongoing trend to regulatory
convergence and cooperation will continue (den Boer, ed, pp 196-97).
By contrast, Neil Walker predicts neither a convergence of differing national approaches nor any agreement on international norms.
He believes that a national backlash against the Maastricht Treaty will
lead European governments to invoke national security concerns in
resisting any pan-European system of accountability for undercover
methods (den Boer, ed, pp 206-08). A serious commitment to transnational cooperation would require governments to entrust the European Parliament or the European Court of Criminal Justice with the
task of supervising police coordination. Yet the regulation of undercover policing impinges too closely on national autonomy and identity
to support the requisite political efforts (den Boer, ed, pp 207-08).
Walker also believes that differences between domestic and
international covert policing reduce political pressures for insisting on
accountability in transnational undercover operations. Citizens of the
various nations worry less about the abuse of proactive undercover
techniques when these are turned against organized crime and terrorism, the paradigmatic international offenses (den Boer, ed, pp 208-10).
The investigation of such offenses is considered "too pressing, too dependent upon highly specialized types of law enforcement skills, and
too difficult to chart in terms of the indices of success associated with
'normal crime', to attract the intensity of skeptical assessment which is
now the lot of domestic police" (den Boer, ed, p 208). Accordingly,
techniques that are controversial when used against mainstream organizations domestically enjoy considerably greater legitimacy when
deployed against foreign criminal networks engaged in organized
crime and terrorism (den Boer, ed, pp 208-10). International undercover work also depends much less than does domestic policing on
mutual trust and a flow of information between investigators and the
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public. Such mutuality requires public confidence in police accountability. In the international context, the absence of such an interchange with a national constituency reduces pressures to hold the police accountable for their methods and legitimates the investigators'
autonomy (den Boer, ed, pp 208-10).
Walker predicts that these obstacles to control will make many
forms of close or routine supervision impossible (den Boer, ed, pp
213-16). But if transnational investigators escape pan-European
norms, will they be held accountable under the national norms of the
countries where they conduct their activities? Or will they escape control because national accountability mechanisms are designed with
domestic investigations in mind? If international investigators cooperating informally are able to avoid international and domestic controls,
unregulated transnational undercover practices developing in a competitive environment might spur imitation domestically and thus lead
indirectly to the expansion of undercover powers and to greater convergence of national norms.
CONCLUSION

The books under review use two separate starting points to conduct a comparative analysis of undercover policing. The Fijnaut and
Marx anthology surveys a variety of national policing systems in order
to understand how each country legitimates, regulates, and controls
undercover policing domestically. The anthology highlights certain
features shared among different countries and puts the variety of national approaches in a wider historical context. Central themes include
the influence of American undercover tactics upon European systems
and the recurring difficulties in taming covert techniques that continually threaten to evade the rule of law. By contrast, den Boer's collection places less emphasis on the varieties of domestic regulation.
Instead, it refers to differing national approaches primarily as a source
of ideas for restructuring Dutch regulation of covert policing. At the
same time, the anthology takes a more international approach to the
problem of undercover investigations. It explores how Dutch practices
will have to harmonize with the needs of transnational undercover investigations and supranational legal norms, like those imposed by
Dutch membership in the European Union and Dutch adherence to
the Schengen Convention and other international treaties.
From their separate vantage points, both volumes illuminate the
difficulties of imposing accountability on law enforcement techniques
whose inherent secrecy insulates them from oversight. Both anthologies discuss the challenges of accommodating domestic solutions to
the increasingly transnational character of undercover investigations.
The den Boer anthology is strongest in its exploration of suprana-
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tional approaches to regulating undercover investigations. In particular, it assesses the prospects of federalizing European legal norms, and
of harmonizing national approaches informally (through supranational police organizations) and formally (through international accords). The Fijnaut and Marx volume is strongest in identifying recurrent themes like the ambiguous legal and moral status of undercover
policing and the influence of foreign models. It also highlights persistent differences in the ways in which different legal systems respond
to these ambiguities and influences.
In discussing the vexing problem of accountability, the den Boer
contributors manifest a somewhat too uncritical enthusiasm for centralized bureaucratic controls as a cure-all for the moral risks and ambiguities of undercover policing. Future discussions of police accountability might profit from a closer look at how centralized oversight
will affect undercover policing at the operational level. Scholars
should attend as much to the norms that should be applied to undercover policing as to the mechanisms for securing compliance. What
sorts of ruses are permissible? What kinds of personal relationships
may the investigators establish with their targets? What sorts of crimes
may undercover agents commit to maintain their cover? Should foreign governments or international agencies assist in the investigations
of crimes that violate the laws of only one country?
Because of its greater focus on the varieties of domestic policing,
the Fijnaut and Marx anthology has more to say about how the surveyed countries answer some of these questions. One tantalizing question that both anthologies leave open, however, is whether the rules
governing transnational investigations will diverge from those governing domestic undercover policing. Will such investigations play by
their own supranational rules, or will they be judged by the laws that
govern domestic policing among their cooperating countries? And if
they do develop their own rule book, will the investigators who run
transnational investigations continue to exert as much influence on
the domestic legal systems of their partners as American undercover
tactics have thus far exerted on much of Western Europe?
Precisely because of their richness, these anthologies suggest further avenues for research. Both volumes make it clear that undercover
policing involves difficult tradeoffs between competing tactics, goals,
and values. How will the increasing importance of transnational undercover investigations affect domestic compromises between the
pursuit of intelligence and the collection of evidence? Will the use of
undercover tactics against terrorism reinforce the tendency to legitimate the introduction of controversial tactics by quarantining them in
specialized units for use only against marginal sectors of society? How
will the more international character of undercover work affect the
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tendency of undercover means to shape the crimes they investigate,
and in some measure to justify their ends? With their focus on the varieties of legal frameworks through which countries accommodate and
limit undercover policing, these works also suggest a series of questions about how these regulations translate into practice. How do investigators interpret these constraints in their day-to-day work? What
forms of deception do they engage in, and how do these compare with
the policy choices struck at higher levels? Who sets the objectives of
undercover operations? To what extent, and why, do they change? The
tradeoffs between deception and coercion, or detection and prevention, like so many of the others, are not only choices made by institutions, but also choices made by individuals within institutional settings
and constraints. Both of these informative and well-constructed anthologies should inspire new efforts to link the course set by governments and legal systems to the institutions and individuals who put
these mandates into practice.

